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Risk-free farming?
by Bruce A. Babcock, Center for Agriculture and Rural Development,
babcock@iastate.edu, 515-294-6785 , Chad Hart
chart@iastate.edu, 515-294-9911
The direction of U.S.farm policy changedwith the passage of the
2002 farm bill and the 2000
Agricultural Risk Protection
Act. Previous farm bills, to-
gether with the old crop insur-
ance program, had gradually
moved the crops sector toward
greater market orientation,
with farmers taking on more
market risk in exchange for
greater planting flexibility. But
the beginning of this decade
brought with it increased
protection against both ad-
verse price movements and
crop losses. These policy
changes were brought about
largely at the behest of farm
commodity organizations,
who argued that they
needed increased protection
against the vagaries of
weather and market condi-
tions. As we will demon-
strate, the reduction in risk
that U.S. crop farmers
obtain from crop insurance
and commodity programs is
now so dramatic that we
may have entered a new era
of risk-free farming.
The U.S. proposals for farm
policy reform to the World
Trade Organization (WTO)
would, if adopted, move U.S.
farm policy back toward its
previous trajectory of greater
market orientation. However,
the WTO talks have stalled, so
it is worthwhile to take a step
back and assess where U.S.
policy currently stands. We use
illustrations of the distribution
of returns with and without
government programs to show
the impacts of these programs
on farm financial risk in a
single growing season. The
assessment begins with a
review of the U.S. farm policy
legislation process and whom it
most benefits.
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What type of producer benefits from
U.S. farm policy?
Evidence would suggest that U.S. farm policy
is primarily designed to meet the interests of
commodity associations. Early in 2001, Larry
Combest, then the chairman of the House
agriculture committee, asked the National
Corn Growers Association, the National
Cotton Council, the American Soybean Asso-
ciation, the Rice Growers Association, the
Wheat Growers Association, the National
Barley Growers Association, and other asso-
ciations what farm program provisions they
wanted to see in the new farm bill. Chairman
Combest, along with the members of the
House and Senate agriculture committees,
then designed a bill to meet their wishes. The
legislation passed through Congress and was
signed into law by the president in May 2002.
These commodity associations are national
associations of farmers. It seems self-evident
that the associations represent the interests
of their farmer-members. But typically, the
association leaders are chosen from the most
successful farmers, who often have large, well-
financed operations with lower-than-average
costs and higher-than-average volumes.
Profit incentives in a commodity system lead
crop producers to focus on low costs and high
yields. Thus, commodity organizations, who are
led by the most successful commodity produc-
ers, will tend to support farm policies that
support the kinds of farm operations that are
most successful in a commodity system.
Mechanisms of support and financial
impacts
Here, we focus on the subsidies that producers
of corn, wheat, oilseeds, rice, cotton, barley, and
grain sorghum receive. We examine corn in
detail to show how farm programs and crop
insurance affect revenue and we include wheat
and cotton for comparison. In addition to farm
program payments, 75 percent of U.S. corn was
insured under the U.S. crop insurance program
in 2003. The most popular product was a form
of revenue insurance whereby the insurance
guarantee increases if the harvest price is
greater than the projected harvest price at
planting time. The most popular coverage level
is 75 percent coverage (the farmer takes the
first 25 percent loss before payments begin). At
the 75 percent coverage level, farmers pay only
45 percent of the actuarially fair premium,
which is defined as the premium that over time
would generate enough total dollars to pay all
insurance claims. Thus farmers receive a sub-
sidy equal to 55 percent of the actuarially fair
premium.
Before examining the financial effects of the
various government programs, let’s look at a
representative farm’s financial picture without
farm programs. At planting time, U.S. farmers
do not know either the price they will receive
for their crops or what their harvested yield will
be. To capture this uncertainty, we build a
representative farm and repeat a crop year
5,000 times and record the outcome. There are
5,000 different yield and price outcomes. We
chose a representative corn farm in Boone
County, Iowa, with a local expected farm price
set at $2.15/bushels (bu) and an expected yield
of 150 bu per acre (ac). The standard deviation
continued on page 3
Figure 1. Histogram of net revenue for a
representative corn farm
Figure 2. Effect of government programs and crop
insurance on risk
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of price is set at $0.45/bu and the standard
deviation of yield is 43 bu/ac.
A histogram constructed from the 5,000 revenue
draws is shown in Figure 1. The histogram
shows the range of possible revenue outcomes as
well as the probability of outcomes. Variable
costs of $150 are subtracted so that the distribu-
tion shows net revenue. One measure of the
amount of risk that a farmer faces is the prob-
ability that revenue will not be adequate to
cover a certain level of variable production costs.
A farmer who covers variable costs has some
money left over to pay off fixed expenses. Figure
1 shows that that average net returns for this
corn farmer are about $163/ac. There is a very
low probability (4 percent) that net returns are
negative. On average, this farmer will have
approximately $163 left over to pay all other
expenses, including land, fixed machinery
expenses, and management. For a cash renter,
land costs would increase variable costs and the
entire histogram would shift to the left, which
demonstrates the increased risk that cash
renters face relative to owner-operators.
Most other U.S. crop farmers face relatively
more risk than this corn farmer. Iowa corn
farmers have the advantage of highly productive
soils and a natural hedge between price and
yield. When yield is low, the price is likely to be
higher than expected, thus buffering the nega-
tive impacts of low yields. And low prices are
likely caused by a bumper crop in Iowa, which
helps insulate Iowa corn farmers from financial
trouble.
Impact of government programs and
crop insurance
Now let’s look at the effects of government
programs on the financial risks of this farm.
The effects of all the programs are revealed by
comparing the distribution of market plus
government receipts to the distribution shown
in Figure 1.
Figure 2 shows the aggregate effect of these
programs on a farmer’s risk. As can be readily
seen, the amount of risk that this farmer faces
is now significantly reduced and the expected
returns over variable costs are dramatically
increased. Average net returns increase 46
percent to about $239/ac with the programs in
place. Perhaps the best way to characterize the
effects of the programs is that with the pro-
grams in place there is now less than a one-in-
six chance that total revenue will fall below
$163/ac, which is the average revenue without
the programs. As shown in Figure 2, there is no
chance that farmers in Boone County will not
be able to cover their non-land variable costs. It
is in this sense that we can speculate that corn
farming in Boone County has become “risk
free.”
Lessons from Australian agriculture
by Mike Duffy, Associate Director for the Leopold Center for Stustainable
Agriculture, mduffy@iastate.edu, 515-294-6161
I recently had the opportunity to spend amonth in Victoria, Australia, in the southeast part of the country. My visit came at
the request of the Australian government to
help evaluate its family farms program. The
government is concerned about the loss of
family farms and began the program to get a
better understanding of the subject and to
determine what could or should be done about
it.
Throughout my career I have had the opportu-
nity to visit farms and meet agriculturalists
from many countries. This was my first oppor-
tunity to spend an extended time in such an
outwardly different agricultural situation.
Victoria has a more moderate climate than
Iowa, but its soils by comparison are very poor.
They face serious problems of water availability
and excess salinity. As a result most agricul-
ture involves grass-based animal production,
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